fc krasnodar
Source: Manual research
Income
Expenditures
TRANSFER FLOW (€M)
| Сезон | Income | Expenditure | Balance | Маркер |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16/17 | 16.9 | 12 | 4.9 | — |
| 17/18 | 2.5 | 15 | -12.5 | world cup prep. fair-play restric. |
| 18/19 | 11.9 | 25.5 | -13.6 | — |
| 19/20 | 20.3 | 29.4 | -9.1 | COVID period |
| 20/21 | 0.76 | 7.09 | -6.33 | COVID period |
| 21/22 | 6.05 | 41.09 | -35.04 | — |
| 22/23 | 10.56 | 9.1 | 1.46 | Invasion shock |
| 23/24 | 5.03 | 19.1 | -14.08 | — |
| 24/25 | 43.5 | 12.75 | 30.75 | — |
| 25/26 | 2.72 | 16.15 | -13.44 | Nowadays |
Context
Governance
Sergey Galitsky, a private investor; the main capital source has historically been tied to the retail business Magnit.
What is happening now
This is not a state corporation but a more “private project”, so the club usually follows cautious decision-making and long-term investment in infrastructure and the academy rather than constant expensive purchases.
Why 2026 may be difficult
When the economy tightens and money becomes more expensive, a private owner tends to de-risk. In that mode the club usually makes fewer big transfers and relies more on its own players and targeted reinforcements.